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      Worm in the Apple German Traitors and Other Influences That Pushed the World Into War: The little-known story of the men who destroyed Adolf Hitler's Germany Friedrich Lenz 10. The ace up England's sleeve - Hitler's miscalculation But to return to Hitler! On August 22, 1939 the Head of State had gathered his Generals around him in Berchtesgaden and explained that he was now firmly decided to settle the question of the Corridor one way or another, even in the face of the British promise of assistance to Poland. He set out in detail that it was no longer reconcilable with Germany's honour and her future, for Poland and the Western powers to refuse the generous offers he had made towards an amicable settlement of the Corridor Question. 1. He believed that Germany was strong enough to overcome Poland, and even to hold her own in a battle against the Western powers; 2. he was convinced that in light of Germany's strength the Western powers would not dare to wage war, but would only threaten, as heretofore; 3. he pointed out the advantage to be gained from the imminent conclusion of the German-Russian Agreement. It must be clear to any reasonable person that Hitler had carefully weighed the pros and cons and, most of all, had precisely assessed the balance of power before coming to this weighty decision. What was the reason for his grave mistake with respect to the intervention of the Western powers, and thus in regard to the outcome of the war itself? 1. He had overlooked the greatest army at the enemy's service - namely, the eager and obliging conspirators, Britain's friends, Hitler's foes. Britain awaited the promised coup, and lifted nary a finger for Poland. 2. His greatest "reinforcements", which he had known how to apply successfully in the diplomatic power struggle up until then, no longer existed, without his knowing it. - This was the exaggerated arms potential, feigned by means of clever propaganda, whose true nature the "German friends" had promptly divulged to the British and which they therefore no longer needed to fear. No sensible German can doubt that Britain would not have dared go to war if she had not been sure of the assistance of such very powerful allies in her greatest enemy's inner sanctum, as it were. Had this situation been otherwise, the German-Polish conflict would have been settled as Hitler wished, without a war, and there would no longer have been any questions remaining unresolved for Germany. Greater Germany would have been unassailable, and even Bolshevism would have had to curb its expansionist activities, or engage in a war that would have been hopeless from the start. The assistance granted the enemy by the traitors was the only reason why Hitler lost the race for power in Europe. The following shows the immense importance that Britain attached to the knowledge of the existence of a plot against Hitler, and the related plans for a coup. In 1939 the British government had "tried" for months to work out a treaty of mutual assistance with Russia. The British House of Commons was very upset that negotiations dragged on for so long without yielding any results, and attempted repeatedly to urge haste and to find out what was going on. The British Government only ever replied evasively. The Russians as well lost patience with the sluggish negotiations, so that on June 29, in a lengthy article, the Russian politician Shdanov expressed his correct conclusion, namely that the British were not really serious at all. The article concluded: "All this indicates that the British and French do not want a treaty with the USSR that would be based on the principles of equality and reciprocity - even if they do solemnly vow day in, day out that they too are for 'equality'; rather, what they want is a treaty in which the USSR has the role of a slave who must bear the entire burden of obligation on his shoulders. But no nation with any self-respect would be party to such a treaty, else it would be a toy in the hands of those who prefer to let others pull their chestnuts out of the fire for them. The USSR, whose power, might and worth are known the world over, can thus not possibly participate in such a treaty."
Hitler and his Foreign Minister, v. Ribbentrop, are criticized most scathingly because, as the
speech to the Generals on August 22, 1939 clearly shows, they did not expect
Britain's intervention - in others words, because they had completely misjudged the world
political
situation. Well, reality is in fact quite different. As early as January 2, 1938, Herr v. Ribbentrop
had reported to Hitler from London: "If England and her allies are stronger than Germany and
her
friends, then in my opinion she will definitely strike sooner or later. I leave it up to the reader to decide whether even Bismarck could have appraised the situation more accurately than von Ribbentrop had at a time when he was not even yet Foreign Minister and could not know all that would happen by August 22, 1939 to aggravate matters. And still, the truth could not save his life. In their August 22 assessment of the European power configuration, Hitler and his Foreign Minister had appraised everything correctly - except that they failed to take into account England's new ally, because he was cloaked by the mantle of treason.
In late September, when Poland had been beaten, he went to see the politician Robert Boothby (England's current representative in Strassbourg), who had "never before seen him so agitated and worried," and said with a deep sigh: "I wish I knew how things really stood. But I'm not told." The day before, he had said to a larger gathering: "We ought never to have given Poland a guarantee without Russia. But since we did, we should have made sure of Russia immediately afterwards, regardless of the cost to us... in this case we should not have declared war." Full of fear for Britain's fate, he even suggested negotiations with Hitler: "But under certain circumstances it would be wise to initiate negotiations, not only for political but also for strategic reasons, if only to gain time." The fact that he then consoled his conversation partner with the reference that in the end the Treaty of Amiens (1802) had not prevented Napoleon's fall is graphic proof that - an Englishman through and through - he concerned himself only with the interests of his own country, in this case the time to be gained, and was perfectly devoid of any moral scruples whatsoever, true to the well-known British maxim of "right or wrong, my country!" Our foreign affairs politicians of the Opposition, who act against the interest of their Fatherland while claiming to do what they do for the sake of world peace and humanity, would profit from this British example. So Hitler was quite right when he assumed on August 22 that Britain would not intervene, especially since voices had been raised even in England, declaring that if negotiations failed the Government would have to step down. This is also the reason why Hitler waited for reports of the dissolution of the British and French Cabinets the day after he concluded his treaty with Russia. But he waited in vain, for the British government lost none of its external composure. On August 25, 1939, despite the loss of Russian support, it nevertheless coolly concluded its Treaty of Mutual Assistance with Poland26 and declared war on Germany.
Russian assistance would have been too costly for them at that point; the help provided by the
German "friends" was cheaper. As early as June, the brothers Kordt had told Mr. Vansittart in
London that Hitler was planning to conclude a treaty with Stalin, and had stated that he would
not
let matters turn to war with Poland if the British were to conclude their treaty with the Russians
first.
26The British were not deterred
from entering into this Mutual Assistance Pact even by the fact that they were very annoyed with
the Polish, who had seized the Olsa region when Czechoslovakia broke up and, in the course of
the Anglo-Russian negotiations, had denied the British the right of free passage for the Russians.
Further, their noisy chauvinism had interfered with the British political game to a considerable
degree. ...back...   
Worm in the Apple German Traitors and Other Influences That Pushed the World Into War: The little-known story of the men who destroyed Adolf Hitler's Germany |
If, on the other hand, Germany can manage
to
shape
her policy vis-à-vis her allies in such a way that a German power configuration is
stronger
than or perhaps equal to the British, it might be possible that Britain would prefer a peaceful
settlement.... Regardless of any tactics or diplomatic interludes which might be attempted with
us,
each and every day in the future that is not guided first and foremost by a view of England as our
most dangerous opponent would be a gain for our enemies. I have striven for friendship with
Britain for years now, and nothing would make me happier than to see it come about. When I
requested the Führer to send me to London I was doubtful whether it might work, but in
light of Edward VIII, a last attempt seemed warranted. Today I no longer believe in the
possibility
of conciliation. Britain does not want a powerful Germany that would represent a constant threat
to the British island. Britain will fight for her hegemonic position!"
That they had judged the situation correctly, and indeed were justified in believing that Britain
would not intervene, is shown by the actions of one of Britain's foremost politicians, namely
Lloyd
George, who is known to have predicted that the next world war would break out over the matter
of the Corridor. He had said to his daughter: "Yes, Heil Hitler, and I say it too, for he is truly a
great man." It is easy to see why he was no longer made privy to domestic British secrets. As
early
as May 19, 1939 he said in the House of Commons: "Without Russia, our guarantees to Poland,
Rumania and Greece are meaningless."