Worm in the Apple German Traitors and Other Influences That Pushed the World Into War: The little-known story of the men who destroyed Adolf Hitler's Germany Friedrich Lenz 7. Allied stalling maneuvers and incitement instead of a desire for peace Amongst the people in general, who are not aware of all the connections, the prevailing opinion is that it was our "theft of Czechoslovakia" which served to raise the ire of the British people and rendered them ripe for war. But this is a serious misconception, for it was already right after 'Munich'21 that the British and French circles who were not content with this peace measure began their incitement against Germany. I will prove this by means of a chronological presentation of various events and addresses, but I wish to point out beforehand that this is a mere fraction of the evidence that could be brought to bear against our opponents: September 30, 1938 - Munich Hitler and Chamberlain declare: "We regard the agreement signed last night and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement as symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another again..." October 3, 1938 - London Chamberlain states in the House of Commons: "Here in this country we have already been engaged in a great rearmament program which continues to grow both in speed and in scope. Let no-one believe that in light of the ratification of the Munich Agreement by the Four Powers we can at this time relax our efforts with respect to this program." October 9, 1938 - Saarbrücken Hitler gives his famous speech, and Hans Grimm comments on it in his Arch-Bishop's Address: "This is the situation that sets the context in which we must view the declaration made by the National-Socialist Reichsführer, the German-Austrian Hitler, on October 9, 1938, when he said: 'The statesmen we deal with want peace. We must believe them on that point. However, they govern nations whose internal structure renders it possible for them to be relieved of their positions at any time, to make way for others who are not quite as desirous of peace. And these others are already waiting in the wings. In England, for example, all it will take is for Mr. Duff Cooper or Mr. Eden or Mr. Churchill to gain power instead of Mr. Chamberlain; we know very well that it would be the aim of these men to immediately start a new world war. They make no secret of this their intent, they declare it openly...; this obliges us to be on our guard, and to look carefully to the protection of the Reich. Inclined to peace at all times, but equally prepared for defense.' For years I have avoided listening to any speech of Hitler's, a man who disturbs my inner mind. But I had to agree with these words of his, and I had to tender him my silent and bitter apology, for he was right; one might disapprove, even despise his strange nature, but he was right, alas. "The subsequent events and actions taken by the government of the Reich, right up to the second and final British declaration of war, could not and ought not to have happened any differently in light of the ever-increasing danger. In view of the storm clouds in the West, the storm clouds in the East, and the clouds gathering even over the Reich itself, every Reich leader, be he Emperor or Party tribune, soldier or pacifist would have to have taken each and every possible measure to ensure national security." October 16, 1938 - London Churchill, in a radio broadcast to America: "...We must arm. Great Britain will give up its centuries-old traditions, and introduce universal conscription... Is this a call to war?" November 30, 1938 - London R. S. Hudson, Secretary of the British Office for Overseas Trade: "The question is the much larger problem of how to counter the new form of German competition throughout the world." December 6, 1938 - Paris The French Secretary of State, speaking about v. Ribbentrop's visit: "He seemed disquieted by certain British developments. He mentioned Churchill's campaign, and also seemed to doubt the sincerity of the British Ministers, who, he thought, had not interpreted the Munich Agreement as a settlement in good faith with Germany, with its end to be a lasting pact for peace, but rather as a means to gain time, with the ulterior motive of waging war later under more favorable conditions." December 10, 1938 - Paris Duff Cooper speaks, consoling himself with the thought that in the case of a conflict, America, the great friend of Western Democracy, would be standing at the ready. December 11, 1938 - Paris The French Secretary of State Bonnet realizes: "The enemies of the National-Socialist regime were resolved to destroy it, but such a hazardous undertaking was only feasible if they patiently awaited the hour when they would be strong enough to defeat their enemy with certitude. I think they had not forgotten the price of challenging Germany and then failing to vanquish her. "The object of all my discussions with the Prime Minister and of my cables abroad was to ensure the utmost efforts towards the arms status and national defence of France and her allies... With noble patriotic enthusiasm, Daladier spurred the completion of his arms program which, commendably, he had initiated in 1936." January 5, 1939 - London Lord Halifax, to the German chargé d'affaires, Dirksen: "...he would not hesitate to describe the article in question, of which he was aware, as a most outrageous defamation of the Führer. It is regrettable that numerous such offenses had occurred again in the past months." January 26, 1939 - Paris Secretary of State Bonnet in the House: "In the event of a war, all the armed forces of Great Britain are at the disposal of France, and vice versa." January 28, 1939 - London Chamberlain: "It is therefore for purposes of defense, not for attack, that we continue to devote unflagging efforts to the task of arms build-up." February 28, 1939 - Paris The German Ambassador Welczek reports to the State Department: "Recently, still prior to the publication of the anti-German excesses in Poland, the Embassy has received reports from absolutely trustworthy sources that indicate certain tendencies towards a revival of the French-Polish Alliance and, concomitantly, the planned, gradual deterioration of German-Polish relations. The main reason cited is the deep impression which the strengthening of the Entente Cordiale between France and England, as well as Chamberlain's various declarations regarding assistance for France, have made on the Polish government; an additional factor is a remarkable degree of English activity in Poland." March 4, 1939 - Teheran The German Ambassador Smend reports to the State Department: "The return of Austria to the Reich resulted in a noticeable cooling of diplomatic relations... While the representatives of other nations expressed satisfaction that a people had come together again, the British side leveled sharp criticism. "In the local English circles, the solution of the Sudeten-German problem has triggered nothing short of hostility towards Germany, which has also found open expression in talks with the Embassy. "Since then, the anti-German sentiments of the local English circles here has increased considerably. The British Delegation and colony are turning into the hotbed of a war psychosis that weaves its web through far more than the actual field of interest. The entire apparatus of the usual rabble-rousing involved in an arms race, as it may be observed today in the British press, on the radio, and in public addresses of the spokesmen of the bellicose party openly opposed to Germany, has a faithful mirror in this British colony. "When, in conversation with Englishmen, one points out the reprehensible and dangerous aspects of these methods, one receives only the chilly remark that the international arms race cannot help but lead to war some day. To these gentlemen, Eden, Churchill and Duff Cooper are the real representatives of the British nation, and their future representatives in fact." March 16, 1939 - Paris Bonnet, commenting on the establishment of the Protectorate: "It was too late to take military steps, and for the other side, in turn, it was too early, since we were still not ready... We wondered whether we would manage to gain the months we still needed to finish arming." March 16, 1939 - Berlin The French Ambassador Coulondre, to Bonnet: "I think we must do everything necessary to at least gain time... On the other hand, the French and British rearmament is an increasing source of worry to the leading National-Socialists. And this, in my opinion, is the fundamental issue... It is necessary to hold out, and to gain time by any and all means at our disposal, until we are fully armed." March 28, 1939 - Paris Secretary of State Bonnet: "Thereupon, Chamberlain proposed to Poland a pact of mutual guarantee, so as to force Poland to defend Rumania if the latter should be attacked by Germany. This obligation marked a decisive turning point in British foreign policy. Chamberlain was fully aware of all the consequences resulting from this step, but he accepted them for the moment, since there was no other way to thwart Hitler." March 28, 1939 - Warsaw The French Ambassador Noel, to the French Secretary of State: "Furthermore, if Poland should actually decide on this course, it is necessary that in order to constrain Poland and to prevent her last-minute evasion of responsibility, Great Britain should commit herself to financial aid in the case of conflict... and that certain economic advantages be proffered which could to an extent satisfy [Poland's] desire for access to colonial possessions. Further, it would be necessary to give Poland express guarantees to ease her concerns with respect to the Soviet Union... For the rest, it goes without saying that a concrete offer of assistance would only appear tempting to Poland, and would only balance any dangers arising therefrom, if Great Britain were to decide to introduce universal conscription during peacetime." July 25, 1939 - Stockholm Sven Hedin, in a conversation with the British Lord Dawson of Penn: Dawson: "The moment that Germany occupies Danzig - whether it be by peaceful means, or with armed force - we will immediately and absolutely declare war on Germany." Sven Hedin: "A world war, for Danzig? Danzig is a German city, and the injustices of the Treaty of Versailles are being revised." Dawson: "It's not so much for the sake of Danzig itself. Danzig, however, means the Corridor, and with the loss of Danzig, in other words of the Corridor, Poland loses access to the sea, and dries up and chokes to death. That's what Germany wants, so as then to be able to treat Poland like she has treated Czechoslovakia. From that point on it is only a step to Rumania and her oil fields, to the Black Sea, the Dardanelles, the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal, in other words, to that vein that carries the lifeblood of our Empire. So, if Danzig falls, it's a matter of the life of the British Empire. We know that a new world war for the sake of Danzig is more than due, and we will take the opportunity when it presents itself." Sven Hedin: "Are you prepared to take such a responsibility?" Dawson: "We understand that there will be nothing left of civilization afterwards, but we will not hesitate one instant." August 7, 1939 - Soenke Nissen Koog According to his book Der letzte Versuch, the Swede Birger Dahlerus had arranged a meeting between Göring and several of his British business acquaintances, and on the suggestion of the Englishmen they had concluded that the danger of war could best be eliminated by a Four-Power Conference. Hitler declared himself willing only a few days later, but the gentlemen from the British government - whose plans were of course quite different from those of that naive little group of Englishmen from among the common folk who had tried together with Dahlerus to conduct their own brand of foreign politics - no doubt nostalgically remembered 'Munich', and what followed instead of a conference was "an interlude that was quite incomprehensible to me [Dahlerus] and, as it was to turn out, most fateful as well; namely, a complete stand-still of negotiations. The only thing I managed to find out was that a British answer was not to be expected any time soon. Many of the people indispensable to these proceedings, we were told, happened to have gone on holidays just then... as was usual at that time of year." This stand-still of negotiations may be incomprehensible to Mr. Dahlerus, but not to anyone else who really thinks about it, for if that Conference had taken place, the parties concerned would have had no excuse for not coming to an agreement, else it would have been obvious to the world who the ones to blame for the failure really were. So they preferred to remain on holidays rather than prevent a war. Surely they could not have thought of a more feeble excuse. August 15, 1939 - Rome The British Ambassador Sir Percy Lorraine informed Ciano that any attempt at a conference, Munich-style, was out of the question, since such a meeting would result in Chamberlain and his statesmen being swept from their position in the government. By whom? By the people? The answer may be found in a report sent in late August 1939 - from London by the German journalist Heinz Medefind, when he had to leave England after a five years' stay there: "For months the British government has done its utmost, through the press, film, radio and Ministerial speeches, to create unrest among the British people. These efforts were heightened considerably in August. On the orders of the various Ministries, the newspapers strove to convince the people that the time has come when the battle for Poland's independence and for the renewed defeat of that frighteningly revitalized Germany must begin. The same old catch-phrases were repeated daily, even hourly. But the desired effect did not come about. "In one of his last speeches in August, Chamberlain tried once again to persuade his people to back his government's goals: We are faced with the imminent danger of war. We would not be fighting for the political future of a far-distant city (Danzig), but for principles whose destruction would mean the end of peace and security for all nations on earth. "Yet even this inflammatory speech of Chamberlain's failed to produce the desired effect, no less than the great campaign had failed that had been carried on for months with the intent of inspiring the masses with enthusiasm for war. "I had occasion, after this speech, to talk to dozens of British men and women. With the sole exception of one, none of them had any sympathy for the call for war. "How badly the effect (of propaganda) had failed became clear to me from the statements of my neighbors and the small businessmen who implored me not to leave England. They did not believe that there would be war - and wanted it even less." With respect to the attitude of the British people, his further descriptions of the last days prior to war and his departure from England agree fully with the account given by Hans Otto Meissner, son of the Secretary of State, in his book So schnell schlägt Deutschlands Herz. September 2, 1939 - London Churchill writes to Chamberlain "...that he was uneasy, that there was talk in Paris of a new diplomatic approach, and that he hoped that the British Head of Government would disregard the difficulties he might encounter in France and proceed to declare war on Germany, thus showing our French friends the proper path to take." September 3, 1939 - Paris Jean Montigny reports: "The slight hesitation on the part of France has roused the ire of the London war-mongers: several Members of Parliament, led by Churchill, invaded the office of the French envoy (in London) and reproached him vehemently for his country's attitude. Corbin had to protest most vigorously against such behavior." September 3, 1939 - Paris The French Secretary of State Bonnet, when he signed the declaration of war: "It seemed to me as though we had suddenly ordered not only the death of millions of people, but also of precious ideas, spiritual values, the destruction of a world... For some seconds I was devastated. But already, calls were coming in again from London. The news had spread that France would not join in the war until 5 am Monday morning. This delay provoked annoyance in Great Britain." They were sitting on pins and needles there, for while another 'Munich' would have preserved world peace - it would also have preserved Hitler. The "foreign affairs politicians" of the Opposition saw and heard none of this, for their glasses were fogged over with hatred, their ears plugged with lies, and their time taken up with the planning of coups against Hitler. ===================== Notes 21As for the time prior to Munich, it ought to suffice to recount the comment which Frau von Ribbentrop relayed to her husband's defense counsel in Nuremberg. In 1937 Churchill had said to Ribbentrop in the Embassy at London: "If Germany regains her power, she will be crushed again." When Ribbentrop objected that it would not be as easy this time as it had been in 1914, since Germany had friends on her side, Churchill rejoined: "Oh, we are quite good at persuading those friends to join us in the end." The British prosecutor declined retrieval and presentation of the report which v. Ribbentrop had sent to Hitler about this, saying: "What my friend Churchill said in the course of that conversation is irrelevant." ...back... Worm in the Apple German Traitors and Other Influences That Pushed the World Into War: The little-known story of the men who destroyed Adolf Hitler's Germany